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NOTES
Vertical Conflicts: The Role of State Law
in Suits under Section 301*
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Purpose of the Note
Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act1 presents a
case study in the interaction of state and federal courts in our federal
system. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills2 read section 301 as
a mandate for the development of a federal common law of labor
contracts, and Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney3 established con-
current jurisdiction in state courts for the development and enforce-
ment of this common law. One of the most difficult practical problems
posed by our federal system arises when the judicial institutions of
one law-making authority are enlisted to enforce and protect rights
created by another. While the United States Supreme Court through
its appellate jurisdiction is the institution charged with the final re-
sponsibility for overseeing a satisfactory solution to this problem, and
while the Court can indicate how competing interests are to be
harmonized in specific controversies and provide some principles
which may be useful in different contexts, it cannot review every state
301 suit. In the long run, success depends upon the earnest labors
of state courts to identify the policies which are in conflict and bring
their energies to bear in an effort to achieve a true resolution of the
competing interests. For the most part, the Court has delineated
the policy values under 301 law, and what remains is the application
of these policies to specific issues which arise during the course of
litigation. It is the purpose of this note to engage in the type of
analytical processes state courts must undertake and to reach some
conclusions concerning the role of state law in suits brought under
section 301.
B. General Considerations
At the outset it is necessary to observe that the outcome of litigation
* This note was awarded the Edmund Morgan Prize, given for the best student
writing submitted to the VANDRvBILT LAw Rlvmwv during the 1967-68 academic year.
1. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1964).
2. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
3. 368 U.S. 502 (1962).
should not be affected by the forum in which it occurs. This result
could be assured if state courts were required, without regard to tradi-
tional classifications of "substance" and "procedure," to decide every
issue precisely as it would be decided in a federal court. This, how-
ever, would ignore not only the state's interest in having a voice in
regulating the conduct of parties before its courts, but also the
practical wisdom that courts perform much more satisfactorily when
applying law with which they are familiar. In any event, such is
not the solution envisioned under 301, nor the one traditionally
chosen by courts employing foreign law. In establishing federal
hegemony over 301, the Lincoln Mills Court said that "the substantive
law to apply.., is federal law, which the courts must fashion from
the policy of our national labor laws."4 By employing the expression
"substantive" law, the Court apparently contemplated the existence
of a "non-substantive" law which could vary with the tribunal enter-
taining the case. It would be a mistake to believe that by using such
language the Court intended to be bound by the traditional substance-
procedure bifurcation. The more sophisticated analysis now being
employed in other areas of federal system conflicts makes clear that
the terms "substance" and "procedure" take on different meanings in
varying contexts, and that they are in fact descriptive rather than
analytical.
5
Two cases decided by the Supreme Court subsequent to Lincoln
Mills supply the requisite analytical tools to begin a study of the
role of state law under 301. In Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour
Co., 6 the Court stated that the subject matter of 301 "is peculiarly one
that calls for uniform law" because the "[t]he possibility that individ-
ual contract terms might have different meanings under state and
federal law would inevitably exert a disruptive influence upon both
the negotiation and administration of collective agreements."7 Build-
ing on this statement, in International Union, UAW v. Hoosier
Cardinal Corp.,8 the Court concluded that "[t]he need for uniformity,
then, is greatest where its absence would threaten the smooth func-
tioning of those consensual processes that federal labor law is chiefly
designed to promote-the formation of the collective agreement and
the private settlement of disputes under it."9 Of course, once it is
decided that a specific issue requires uniformity, it follows from
4. 353 U.S. at 456.
5. See Sampson v. Channell, 110 F.2d 754 (1st Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 310 U.S.
650 (1940).
6. 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
7. Id. at 103.
8. 383 U.S. 696 (1966).
9. Id. at 702.
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Lucas that the matter must be governed by federal law. On the
other hand, if the need for uniformity is lacking, states are free to
apply local law to the extent, at least, that the federal right under
consideration is not subverted. 10
With the relevant policy values now in mind, it is possible to
begin a study of the role of state law under section 301. It should be
noted that state law may become relevant under section 301 in three
ways. As the Court noted in Lincoln Mills, "... state law, if compat-
ible with the purpose of § 301, may be resorted to in order to find the
rule that will best effectuate the federal policy .... Any state law ap-
plied, however, will be absorbed as federal law and will not be an
independent source of private rights."" Thus the collective body of
state law may be relevant in the search for a rule of federal law. In
addition, in at least two other ways state law is important. Occasion-
ally, in areas affected with a federal interest but not requiring uniform-
ity on a specific point, federal law will choose state law, that is, the
differing rules of the fifty states will be chosen by federal law to
fill a gap in the federal regulatory scheme and will be binding on
both state and federal courts.12 Finally, state law will apply ex
proprio vigore in those "non-substantive" areas averted to in Lincoln
Mills. It is with the latter two uses of state law that this note is
concerned.
II. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
The jurisdictional grant in section 301 contains no statute of limita-
tions, and there exists no general statute of limitations for the enforce-
ment of federal rights. Traditionally, in situations where Congress
has granted a right without placing a time limitation on enforcement
suits, the federal courts have applied state statutes of limitations,13
and indeed, there is considerable authority to the effect that the Rules
of Decision Act14-which makes "the laws of the several states . . .
rules of decision . . . in the Courts of the United States, in cases
where they apply"-requires the application of state limitations.15
However, the tradition has not been uniform. It is clear that even
10. See Central Vermont Ry. v. White, 238 U.S. 507 (1915).
11. 353 U.S. at 457.
12. See United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341 (1966).
13. Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v. Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390 (1906) (antitrust
treble damage suit); Brady v. Daly, 175 U.S. 148 (1899) (copyright suit); Campbell
v. Haverhill, 155 U.S. 610 (1895) (patent infringement suit); Gonzales v. Tuttman,
59 F. Supp. 858 (D.C.N.Y. 1945) (Fair Labor Standards Act suit).
14. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1964).
15. See, e.g., Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v. Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390 (1906);
Brady v. Daly, 175 U.S. 148 (1899); Campbell v. Haverhill, 155 U.S. 610 (1895).
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under the Rules of Decision Act state statutes do not have to be
applied if they discriminate against the enforcement of federal
rights,16 and on at least one occasion the Supreme Court has applied a
limitations provision of an analogous federal right due to the similarity
of the two causes of action.'7 It appears that courts enforcing federal
rights have five alternatives in resolving the limitations question.
They could: (1) apply state limitations; (2) judicially create a uniform
federal limitation; (3) apply the limitation in an analogous federal
statute; (4) apply an equitable doctrine of laches; or (5) simply
place no limitation at all upon the bringing of suit.
With regard to 301 suits, the second alternative has been rejected as
patent judicial legislation,18 and the third alternative has had little
use in 301 litigation because courts have failed to find an analogous
cause of action.19 The fourth and fifth alternatives were applied by
at least one court,20 but most of the lower courts facing the 301
limitations problem have applied state statutes, although apparently
none did so on the basis of the Rules of Decision Act.21 The Supreme
Court resolved the issue for future 301 suits in International Union,
UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp.2 by expressly holding that federal
law chooses state law for the purpose of placing a time limitation on
301 actions. Although not mentioning the authoritative source of
earlier decisions (Rules of Decision Act), the Court noted the long
line of federal cases applying state limitations to the enforcement of
federal rights, and viewed Hoosier as following respected precedent.23
However, in a footnote the Court limited the reach of its decision
by observing that the case before it closely resembled a common law
16. See, e.g., Davis v. Rockton & Rion R.R., 65 F. Supp. 67 (W.D.S.C. 1946)
(refusing to apply S.C. one year limitation on actions for wages under federal statutes).
17. McAllister v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 357 U.S. 221 (1958) (applied Jones Act
limitation to action for unseaworthiness).
18. Fischbach & Moore, Inc. v. I.U.O.E., 198 F. Supp. 911 (S.D. Cal. 1961).
19. Harmon v. Martin Bros. Container & Timber Prods. Corp., 227 F. Supp. 9 (D.C.
Ore. 1964) (rejecting 6 month's limitation on unfair labor practice charges in § 10(b)
NLRA); Fischbach & Moore, Inc. v. I.U.O.E., 198 F. Supp. 911 (S.D. Cal. 1961)
(rejecting antitrust statute of limitations); Tully v. Fred O]son Mfr. Service Co.,
27 Wis. 2d 476, 134 N.W.2d 393 (1965).
20. Fischbach & Moore, Inc. v. I.U.O.E., 198 F. Supp. 911 (S.D. Cal. 1961) (applied
a combination of laches and no limitation).
21. See, e.g., United Mine Workers v. Meadow Creek Coal Co., 263 F.2d 52
(6th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 1013; Waters v. San Dimas Ready Mix Concrete,
222 Cal. App. 2d 980, 35 Cal. Rptr. 215 (1963); Breitman v. Brody, 113 Cal. App. 2d
642, 248 P.2d 932 (1952); Tully v. Fred Olson Mtr. Service Co., 27 Wis. 2d 476, 134
N.W.2d 393 (1965).
22. 383 U.S. 696 (1966).
23. The Court did not view McAllister v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 357 U.S. 221
(1958), supra note 17 and accompanying text, as a departure from this tradition,' but




action for breach of contract and refused to take a position on whether
the rule adopted would be applicable to other types of 301 suits.
24
The plaintiff urged the Court to devise a uniform limitation to close
the gap left by Congress. Refusing to do so, the majority noted that
the "range of judicial inventiveness [called for by Lincoln Mills and
federal labor policy] ... [must] be determined by the nature of the
problem," and that federal labor policy did not call for a uniform
limitation on 301 suits. Further, uniformity is needed only "... . where
its absence would threaten the smooth functioning of those con-
sensual processes that federal labor law is chiefly designed to pro-
mote... ."5 When the question of limitation of actions arises these
processes have already broken down, and, thus, there is no compelling
need for uniformity.26 With its careful definition of uniformity,
Hoosier will influence the resolution of many conflicts between state
and federal policies in state 301 suits. Nonetheless, with respect to
the statutes of limitations problem itself, the decision leaves many
questions unanswered.
In Hoosier, Indiana was both the forum state and the jurisdiction in
which all the operative events occurred, and accordingly the Court
expressed no opinion as to whether in a multi-state problem a choice
of law should be made in accord with the principle of Klaxon Co. v.
Stentor Mfg. Co., which holds that federal courts apply the choice
of law rules of the state in which they sit.28 If, instead of applying
state law, the federal courts were to fashion their own choice of law
rules for 301 suits, then the further question would arise as to whether
those rules would govern 301 suits in state court. The Court could
have obviated this problem, if, in following the long line of federal
precedent, it had relied on the authoritative source at the heart of
those previous decisions-the Rules of Decisions Act. In light of the
construction placed upon that statute by Erie R.R. v. Tompkins,29
24. 383 U.S. at 705 n.7.
25. Id. at 702.
26. Id. Although it seems clear that statute of limitations questions do not affect
the bargaining process as directly as other questions, such as arbitration or manage-
ment rights clauses, it is also clear that any question in a 301 suit will arise only after
the consensual processes have broken down. The dissent contended that the limitations
provisions themselves would have an impact on the negotiation of collective agree-
ments. 383 U.S. 711 n.2.
27. 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
28. Klaxon, of course, was a diversity suit and thus decided under different policy
considerations than those with which a 301 court would be confronted. The case
is used here, insofar as it stands, for the application of state choice of law rules by
federal courts.
29. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). The construction referred to in the text is that the word
'qaws" in the Rules of Decision Act includes the decisional law as well as the statutory
law of the state.
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no question could arise over the applicability of state choice of law
rules. However, it is submitted that the Court's approach did not
remove the force from earlier interpretations of the Rules of Decision
Act. Hoosier indicates that the limitations question is not affected
by the need for uniformity mandated by Lincoln Mills, and pre-
sumably this applies equally to its choice of law aspect, thus re-
moving the need to create a rule binding on state courts. Also, it
seems clear that if the federal courts in a state were to apply a choice
of law rule different from the state courts, forum shopping would
result. This policy consideration and the authority of earlier cases30
under the Rules of Decision Act point toward the application of the
Klaxon principle.
It should be noted that if federal courts apply the choice of law
rule of the state in which they sit, some forum shopping could still
result, for the party may have a choice concerning the state in which
suit is brought. This forum shopping could be eliminated either by
fashioning a federal statute of limitations for 301 suits, or by creating
a federal choice of law rule binding on the states. The first alternative
is now up to Congress in light of Hoosier.
The second alternative has some attractive aspects. In addition to
eliminating the forum shopping problem, a uniform choice of law
rule would have -the advantage of placing the federal courts in a
position to influence the development of conflict of law rules gen-
erally. In the Hoosier decision there is sufficient basis to determine
what that uniform choice of law rule might be. In choosing between
two Indiana statutes of limitations, the Court indicated that the
choice of the shorter limitation was consistent with the federal labor
goal of encouraging rapid resolution of labor disputes.31 This goal was
inferred from the six-month limitation on the bringing of unfair labor
practice charges Thus, it seems that the length of conflicting statute
of limitations provisions would be a relevant consideration in the
proper choice of law. A rule could be devised which simply pointed
toward the shortest limitation available, or if the "contacts approach"33
30. E.g., Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v. Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390 (1906). For
a contrary reading of the cases referred to in the text, see Mr. Justice Whites dissent-
ing opinion in Hoosier, 383 U.S. at 709. But see, Gonzales v. Tuttman, 59 F. Supp.
858 (1945) (FLSA action applying state conflicts rule to find applicable statute of
limitations.)
31. 383 U.S. at 707.
32. 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1964).
33. See RESTATEmNT (SEcoND) OF CoNTFLCT OF LAws § 332 (Tent. Draft No. 6,
1960) for a presentation of the relevant considerations in applying the contacts appioach
to a contracts conflicts problem. The purpose of the contacts approach is to apply the
law of the place having the most significant relationship with the matter under dispute.
Auten v. Auten, 308 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E.2d 99 (1954).
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were adopted, the federal goal of rapid disposition of labor disputes
could come into play by influencing the choice of the shorter limita-
tion when the qualitative and quantitative contacts were in equilib-
rium.
Nonetheless, it would appear that the fashioning of a uniforri
federal choice of law rule would be inconsistent with the mandate of
the Rules of Decision Act unless attendant with strong justifications
directed toward the protection of federal labor policy. In view of
the formulation of that policy given by the Court in Hoosier, it ap-
pears that the required justifications are absent. It is submitted, then,
that the Rules of Decision Act requires the application of state choice
of law rules to statute of limitations questions in suits under section
301.
Although Hoosier provides the basis for ascertaining the applicable
limitations period, at least in the absence of multi-state conflicts, it
leaves open the question of what law applies to such matters as:
when the cause of action accrued and under what conditions the
running of the statute is tolled. The dissent assumed in a footnote
that federal law would govern at least with respect to such matters
as when the cause of action accrued and whether fraudulent con-
cealment tolled the statute.M Certainly these particular assumptions
are consistent with decisions in other areas where state statutes of
limitations have been applied to federal rights.35 However, the
majority, in treating the tolling issue, may have laid the framework
for an argument that state law should govem.6 The plaintiff argued
that the statute was tolled by a previous action brought in the state
court involving the same controversy which had been dismissed as
not cognizable under Indiana law. Distinguishing Burnet v. New
York Central R.R., which had held that bringing a timely suit in
state court served to toll the Federal Employers' Liability Act statute
of limitations, the Court stated that the basis of that decision could
be found in Congress' clear expression of the need for a uniform
time bar in FELA cases and noted the absence of such an expression
in section 301. In addition, the majority felt it necessary to observe
34. 383 U.S. 711 n.2.
35. See, e.g., Cope v. Anderson, 331 U.S. 461 (1947) (accrual of action to assess
shareholders of national banks); Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392 (1946)
(fraudulent concealment as tolling statute of limitations in national bank assessment
suit).
36. In a footnote the majority noted that neither party bad disputed the accrual
date of the cause of action and cited Cope v. Anderson, 331 U.S. 461 (1947), thus
apparently recognizing that question as one governed by federal law.
37. 380 U.S. 424 (1965).
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in a footnote that the union had failed to rely on the Indiana saving
statute.38
There seems to be no justification for departing from federal prece-
dent established in disposing of problems in other areas in which
state statutes of limitation have been applied to federal rights. From
these authorities it seems clear that questions such as when the cause
of action accrues,3 9 what constitutes commencement of the action,40
and when tolling results from fraudulent concealment,41 are to be
governed by federal law, perhaps on the theory that they go to the
definition of the right. Such questions as tolling for incapacity,
imprisonment,4 or absence from the state,4 may be governed by
state law,45 perhaps on the theory that these problems are not affected
by a federal interest.
III. TAL FRACEICE AND PROCEDUBE
A. Pleading
Although the courts have not considered the extent to which state
rules of pleading may be applied in actions under section 301,'4
there are a number of cases defining the role of state pleading require-
ments in actions to enforce other federally-created rights.47 In Davis
v. Wechsle; 48 the Supreme Court stated that "[w]hatever springes
the State may set for those who are endeavoring to assert rights that
the State confers, the assertion of federal rights, when plainly and
reasonably made, is not to be defeated under the name of local
38. 383 U.S. at 708 n.1.
39. Cope v. Anderson, 331 U.S. 461 (1947); Rawlings v. Ray, 312 U.S. 96 (1941).
40. Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949).
41. Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392 (1946).
42. Hoffman v. Keller, 193 F. Supp. 733 (D.C. Ore. 1961) (dicta); Kenny v.
Killian, 133 F. Supp. 571 (D.C. Mich. 1955) (dicta).
43. Gordon v. Garrson, 77 F. Supp. 477 (D.C. Ill. 1948).
44. Barney v. Oelrichs, 138 U.S. 529 (1891).
45. For a thorough listing of tolling decisions in actions involving application of
state statutes of limitations to federally-created rights, see Annot., 90 A.L.R.2d 265
(1963).
46. There have been a number of cases arising under § 301 in which the question of
the sufficiency of the pleadings was involved. These cases did not, however, recognize
the choice of law problem, although the results seem to be in agreement with the
conclusions which will be reached herein. E.g., Kennedy v. Local 659, UAW, 3 Mich.
App. 629, 143 N.'W.2d 133 (1966); Maddock v. Lewis, 386 S.W.2d 406, cert. denied,
381 U.S. 929 (Mo. 1965); Jones v. International Union of Operating Eng'rs, 72 N.M.
322, 383 P.2d 571 (1963).
47. See, e.g., Allied Stores v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522 (1959) (assertion of a constitu-
tional claim in a state court action); Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313 (1958)
(same); Brown v. Western By., 338 U.S. 294 (1949) (state FELA action); Davis v.
Wechsler, 263 U.S. 22 (1923) (same); Solum v. Farmers & Merchants Natl Bank,
269 Minn. 431, 131 N.W.2d 231 (Minn. 1964).
48. 263 U.S. 22, 24 (1923).
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practice." In a later case, Brown v. Western, Ry.,49 the Court clarified
Davis by holding that federal law determines what gives rise to a
right to enforce a federal right, that is, federal law establishes the
elements which are necessary to accord an injured party a claim for
relief, even though he asserts his claim in a state court.5 ° Neverthe-
less, the Court indicated that the states may impose certain rules of
particularity in pleading, provided that such rules are not applied
so stringently as to impose unnecessary burdens upon rights of re-
cov6 ry authorized by federal laws.5'
Thus, under the authority of Brown and Davis, it would appear
that in state court actions under section 301, federal law would
determine whether a cause of action had been stated, but that
state courts may apply rules which, to some extent, control partic-
ularities such as the specificity with which allegations must be stated,
the procedures for remedying irrelevant and redundant statements,
and the way in which pleadings must be verified, so long as these
rules do not impose unnecessary burdens on the right to recover.
Such a result appears to be supported by sound reasoning. The
49. 338 U.S. 294 (1949). In the dissent, Mr. Justice Frankfurter analyzed the
applicable law question as follows: "Federal law, though invoked in a State Court,
delimits the Federal claim-defines what gives a right to recovery and what goes to
prove it. But the form in which the claim must be stated need not be different from
what the State exacts in enforcement of like obligations created by it, so long as such
a requirement does not add to, or diminish, the right as defined by Federal law, nor
burden the realization of this right in the actualities of litigation." Id. at 300.
50. In line with this thought, it would appear that federal lav should also determine
whether a state court has legislative jurisdiction under a federal statute. For example,
there appears to be some dispute in the cases arising under § 301 as to whether a
party bringing an action must plead only that the union involved represents employees
engaged in commerce, or whether it must be pleaded that the employees in issue are
employed in an industry affecting commerce. Compare Brewery Workers v. Adolph
Coors Co., 59 L.R.R.M. 2947, 2949 (D.C. Col. 1964) ("[union] may not bring suit
.. . unless it represents employees of the industry with which it has the contract and
that same industry is one affecting commerce . . ... "), with Block Pontiac, Inc. v.
Candando, 66 L.R.R.M. 2371 (D.C.E.D. Pa. 1967) (for purposes of jurisdiction, it is
sufficient if only union involved in commerce). Since this matter is so intimately related
to the operation and definition of the federal right, it would appear that uniformity
requires that a federal rule be developed.
51. Davis v. Weehsler, 263 U.S. 22, 24 (1923).
52. An example of an unnecessary burden on the right to recover was apparently
involved in Chasis v. Progress Mfg. Co., 382 F.2d 773 (3d Cir. 1967). In that
case the defendant alleged that the district court did not have jurisdiction under §
301 because the plaintiff had not alleged a breach of contract, nor had he alleged the
specific provisions of the contract which had been violated. The court held that "[t]o
require a plaintiff to set out each and every contractual fact and contention in detail
before federal jurisdiction would attach under § 301 would be unreasonable and un-
warranted in light of the purpose underlying o§ 301 and the function of the complaint
in federal pleading." Id. at 777. While this case arose in the federal courts, which
have long maintained a more liberal method of pleading,, it would appear that the
policies behind § 301 and the need for uniformity in this area would similarly prohibit
a state from imposing over-exacting pleading requirements.
enforcement of collective bargaining agreements is a matter of na-
tional interest, and therefore, it is vital that the courts reach uniform
results regarding matters affecting the collective bargaining and
dispute settlement processes. 3 To assure uniformity, it is necessary,
regardless of the forum, that the courts follow only one interpretation
of the elements which must be pleaded to give rise to a right of
recovery. On the other hand, with respect to the particularities of
pleading there is no significant need for uniformity, since such re-
quirements have little or no effect on the outcome of litigation, and
consequently diverse rules would not lead to different results in
different forums.54 In addition to the absence of a need for uniformity
in this regard, allowing the state courts to apply rules with which
they are more familiar will promote efficient judicial administration.
55
B. Burden of Proof
To date, it has not been specifically determined whether in suits
arising under section 301 the question of burden of proof is to be
governed by federal or state law.5 6 In entering upon a discussion of
this question, it is necessary to review the three burdens which the
term "burden of proof" is used to describe-the burden to plead,
the burden of producing evidence, and the burden of persuasion.
5 7
The first burden is normally placed upon the party seeking to estab-
lish a given fact. The second burden, the burden of producing evi-
dence, is generally placed initially upon the party pleading the exis-
tence of a fact and requires for its satisfaction sufficient evidence to
prevent the judge from sustaining an opponent's motion for directed
verdict. Once a party has satisfied this burden, it generally shifts to
his opponent who must, in turn, come forth with evidence sufficient
to prevent an adverse ruling against him on the issue. The third
burden, the burden of persuasion, becomes important only after both
parties, having sustained their burdens of producing evidence, raise
53. International Union, UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696 (1966).
54. Furthermore, if particularities are applied so stringently as to affect the outcome
of litigation and, thereby, uniformity, the Supreme Court can remedy the situation
since it retains the power to review state court decisions dealing with the sufficiency
of pleading in actions involving federal rights. Brown v. Western Ry., 338 U.S. 294
(1949).
55. See Cheatham & Reese, Choice of the Applicable Law, 52 CoLum. L. REv. 959
(1952).
56. There have been cases arising under § 301 concerning the question of burden
of proof, but these cases have not indicated whether federal or state law applies.
Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967) (employee has burden of proving unfair repre-
sentation by union); Williams v. Wheeling Steel Corp., 266 F. Supp. 651 (D.C. W. Va.
1967) (same).




a genuine issue of fact which can be submitted to the trier-of-fact.
This burden, which is also generally placed upon the party pleading
the existence of a fact, does not shift during the trial and requires the
party charged with the burden to persuade the trier-of-fact that the
fact which he alleges is true.
All of the burdens which the term "burden of proof" is used to
describe have been held to be a matter of federal law in suits to
enforce other federal rights with respect to which the federal and
state courts have concurrent jurisdiction.68 Thus, in suits under the
Jones Act5 9 and the Federal Employers' Liability Act,6 1 state courts
have been required to apply federal, rather than state, rules of burden
of proof.6' In the early cases dealing with this question, the reason
given for the application of federal law was that burden of proof is
more than a "mere matter of procedure," but instead goes to the
"very substance" of the federally created right.62 As often happens,
the Court in those cases stated its reasoning in terms of conclusions,
and consequently, they are not very helpful in determining the ap-
propriate law to be applied to the matter of burden of proof in suits
seeking to enforce federally-created rights.
However, in a later case, Garrett v. Moore-McCormick Co.,6 3
which arose under the Jones Act and in admiralty, the Court appears
to have used a method of analysis which may be helpful in determin-
ing whether state or federal rules of burden of proof are to be applied
under section 301. In Garrett, there was a conflict between the federal
rule and the Pennsylvania rule concerning which party had the
burden of proving the validity of a release of liability. The federal
rule placed the burden on the defendant shipowner to plead and
prove a valid release, while the Pennsylvania rule placed the burden
on the plaintiff seaman to prove the invalidity of a release. As in
earlier cases decided under the FELA, 4 the Court resolved the
conflict in favor of the application of the federal rule. However,
instead of merely stating that the burden of proof was "substantive,"
58. See, e.g., Garrett v. Moore-McCormack, 317 U.S. 239 (1942) (Jones Act-
burden of producing evidence and burden of persuasion); Hill v. Smith, 260 U.S. 592
(1923) (Bankruptcy Act-burden of producing evidence); New Orleans & Northeastern
R.R. v. Harris, 247 U.S. 367 (1918) (FELA-burden of producing evidence and
burden of persuasion); Central Vermont Ry. v. White, 238 U.S. 507 (1915) (same).
59. 41 Stat. 1007 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1952).
60. 35 Stat. 65 (1908), as amended, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1952).
61. See Hill, Substance and Procedure in State FELA Actions-The Converse of the
Erie Problemp, 17 Omo ST. L.J. 384-90 (1956); Note, Procedural Protection for
Federal Rights in State Courts, 30 U. CiN. L. REv. 184 (1961).
62. See, e.g., New Orleans & N.E. R.R. v. Harris, 247 U.S. 367 (1918); Central
Vermont Ry. v. White, 238 U.S. 507 (1915).
63. 317 U.S. 239 (1942).
64. See McAllister v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 357 U.S. 211 (1958).
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the Court provided two basic reasons as to why this question should
be governed by federal law.
The Court stated that there is a need for a-uniform application of
the Jones Act ".... throughout the country, unaffected by 'local views
of common law rules'."65 Implicit in the Court's reasoning is that this
policy of uniformity of result would be frustrated if the states were
permitted to apply different rules of burden of proof. This reasoning
appears to be valid, both in regard to the burden of producing evi-
dence and the burden of persuasion. A case may turn on the issue
of who has the burden of producing evidence, since probative evi-
dence of the existence of a fact may be unavailable or too burdensome
to acquire.r Thus, to permit different jurisdictions to place this
burden on different parties would lead to diverse results regarding
the same issue and would thereby defeat the policy of uniformity.
Theoretically, this same reasoning can be applied to the burden of
persuasion, although, practically speaking, the situation in which this
burden affects the outcome of litigation-equilibrium of the evidence
in the mind of the trier-probably has never arisen.67 Nevertheless,
diverse rules of burden of persuasion could possibly lead to different
results on a particular issue and should, therefore, be governed by
federal law to assure uniformity.
As a second reason, the Garrett Court stated that the policy behind
the Jones Act required the application of federal law to the burden
of proving a valid release. The Court noted that the seaman has
traditionally been regarded as a "ward of admiralty" who is to be
protected from shipowners seeking to take undue advantage of him.
To place the burden upon the seaman to prove the invalidity of a
release would contravene this policy and deny him part of the federal
right which Congress created for his benefit. Since the matter of
burden of proof is so intimately related to the federally-created right,
the Court thought it mandatory that it apply a federal rule of
burden of proof which would place the burden upon the defendant
shipowner to prove a valid release.
While distinctions can be made, the approach taken by the Court
in Garrett is similar to the approach in Hoosier regarding the question
of statutes of limitations under section 301. In both cases the Court
examined the specific issue before it with a view toward determining
whether federal policy required uniformity and thus the application
of federal, rather than state, law. Examining the issue of burden of
proof in light of the Court's reasoning in Hoosier and its earlier
65. Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S. at 244.
66. See McCoRMcti, EVIDENCE 685 (1954).
67. Id. at 686.
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decision in Garrett, it is clear that the burden of producing evidence
and the burden of persuasion are matters which require uniformity
and should thus be governed by federal law.
Hoosier states that a matter requires uniformity when it affects the
functioning of the collective bargaining process or the private settle-
ment of disputes. Clearly, it is of concern to the parties at the
bargaining table as to which of them will have the burdens of produc-
ing evidence and persuading a trier-of-fact of the interpretation of a
contract term. Likewise, the imposition of the burden of proof will
affect the private settlement of disputes, as in instances where an
employee whose grievance has been compromised by his union brings
suit against his employer alleging that his union unfairly represented
him during the grievance procedure.68 To permit diverse rules of
burden of proof, and consequently diverse results, would lead to
uncertainty at the bargaining table and would allow frustration of
the contract procedure for settling disputes.
However, in Hoosier the Court held that since statutes of limitations
do not "come into play" until the collective bargaining and settlement
processes have broken down, there is no need for uniformity. This
holding raises the question of exactly what the Court meant by the
words "come into play." If these words mean "operative," then
clearly there would be no need for uniform rules of burden of proof
or any other matter of law that does not arise until trial. Such a
meaning could not have been intended, for it would permit serious
frustration of the federal scheme for bringing about industrial peace.
It is far more likely that the words "come into play" were used by
the Court to describe the situation in which the rule under considera-
tion would not "affect" the pre-trial conduct of the collective bargain-
ing and settlement processes. Viewed in this light, it appears that
the rules of burden of proof do "come into play" before the break-
down of the collective bargaining and settlement processes, for they
may "affect" both the end-product of collective bargaining and the
manner in which disputes are settled. Furthermore, burden of proof
rules may become very important in effectuating the policies of the
federal labor laws. For instance, in Vaca v. Sipes,69 the Supreme
Court stated that an employee must come forward with clear and
convincing evidence of unfair representation before he can sue his
employer on a grievance which his union has compromised. By
placing this burden on the plaintiff employee, the Court has accorded
more stability to the decisions reached during the grievance procedure
68. See, e.g., Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967); Williams v. Wheeling Steel Corp.,
266 F. Supp. 651 (D.C. W. Va. 1967).
69. 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
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and has placed unions in a better position to settle disputes short of
arbitration when that step would not be advantageous. Thus, it
appears that the courts must fashion uniform rules of burden of proof
which will effectuate the purposes of the federal labor laws and
which, because of their intimate relationship with the federal rights
created under section 301, must be considered as a part of them
and applied as a matter of federal law.
C. Directed Verdicts
Concern with the motion for directed verdict rests in two areas:
(1) the quantum of probative evidence necessary to overcome such
a motion; and (2) the standard utilized to weigh the evidence. The
motion for directed verdict is invoked to test whether the opposing
party has sustained his burden of producing evidence. When such a
motion is made the judge must weigh the evidence and determine
whether there is sufficient evidence to warrant the submission of the
case to the trier-of-fact.
In determining the sufficiency of the evidence on a motion for
directed verdict the courts have utilized two standards. The first
standard is to examine only the evidence favorable to the party against
whom the verdict is sought. If he has produced sufficient evidence
to warrant the jury reasonably to infer that the ultimate proposition
of fact which he is alleging is true, then the motion will fail, even in
the face of overwhelming evidence to the contrary. In the event
the jury renders a 'verdict for the party against whom the motion
for directed verdict was made, the judge will examine the evidence
on both sides on motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict,
and if the jury's verdict was unreasonable, it will be set aside. The
second standard which the courts have used in weighing the evidence
is to examine 'the evidence on both sides and issue a preemptory
ruling if a verdict for the party opposing the motion would necessarily
be set aside on a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
It is reasonably clear from prior authority that in state court actions
to enforce federally-created rights the determination of whether a
particular party -has introduced sufficient evidence to overcome a
directed verdict and to get his case before the trier-of-fact will ulti-
mately be subject to review by the Supreme Court.70 The Supreme
Court appeared to give recognition to this doctrine in Vaca v. Sipes
1
when it stated in a state court suit arising under 301 that ". . . we
cannot uphold the jury's award, for we conclude that as a matter of
70. Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U.S. 53 (1949); Lavender v. Kurn, 327 U.S. 645
(1946); Bailey v. Central Vermont Ry., 319 U.S. 350 (1943).
71. 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
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federal law the evidence does not support a verdict that the Union
breached its duty of fair representation."72 While the Court was
speaking of overturning a jury verdict, it can be implied that the
sufficiency of the evidence supporting the allowance of a directed
verdict in a state court 301 action would be subject to the same
review. It is obvious that this power of review is necessary to insure
that state courts apply proper standards of burden of proof and do
not frustrate the policy of uniformity.
Although it is clear from Vaca and other cases involving federal
rights that the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a directed
verdict is a matter of federal law, there is, at most, only sparse
authority concerning the question of whether state or federal stan-
dards of weighing the evidence on a motion for directed verdict are
to be applied. In cases arising under the FELA,73 the Supreme Court
has not made a specific statement on this matter, and it appears to
permit state courts to utilize their own standards of weighing the
evidence."4 There are reasonable grounds for permitting state courts
to follow their own standards. Theoretically, there should be no
difference in the outcome of litigation regardless of whether the
court uses the judgment n.o.v. standard or the standard which looks
to the evidence most favorable to the opponent of the motion, since
at one point or another the judgment n.o.v. standard is applied and
the court examines the evidence on both sides of the issue. 5 In any
event, even if the application of different standards would lead to
diverse results, this does not appear to be the type of problem which
requires uniformity as defined by Hoosier. The standards used on a
motion for directed verdict are almost wholly unrelated to the sub-
stantive issues of law involved in labor relations, and consequently,
they would not be considered by the parties at the bargaining table
or during the dispute settlement process. These standards do not
"come into play" until the latter processes have broken down and
72. Id. at 193.
73. See cases cited note 39 supra.
74. However, in Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U.S. 53 (1949), Mr. Justice Black,
speaking for the majority, indicated that there might be a federal rule concerning the
standard to be applied when weighing the evidence on a motion for directed verdict.
He stated that "[ilt is the established rule that in passing upon whether there is
suffc ient evidence to submit an issue to the jury we need look only to the evidence
and reasonable inferences which tend to support the case of a litigant against whom
a preemptory instruction has been given." Id. at 57. There has been no clarification
of this statement to date, and it appears that the states are still free to apply either
of the traditional directed verdict standards.
75. Furthermore, in those jurisdictions employing the standard which looks only to
the evidence most favorable to the opponent of the motion, the judge probably cannot
in reality refrain from weighing the evidence on both sides.
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should, therefore, for the purpose of convenience and promoting
efficient judicial administration be governed by state law.76
D. Appeals
Consistent with the policies discussed regarding pleading,"7 it is
clear as a general proposition that states may apply local ideas of
appellate practice to appeals in suits based upon federal law. On the
other hand, it seems equally clear that "the assertion of federal
rights .. .is not to be defeated under the name of local practice."
78
Taken together, these two propositions are so widely accepted that
few problems concerning what law governs the appeal of an order in
a 301 suit seem to have arisen. For the most part, state courts apply
local rules of appealability without facing the question of whether
their action is permissible under federal law.79 Such a question was
raised in Laufman v. Hall-Mack Co.80 and was resolved in favor of
local rule application. In that case the District Court of Appeals in
California held that no appeal lay from an order directing arbitration
even though it appeared to the court that such an order would be
appealable in a federal court under the same facts. Central Vermont
R.R. v. White8' was cited for the proposition that local practice
governed unless it so subverted the federal right as to make it mean-
ingless. Relying on the Steelworkers trilogy,82 the court found that
federal policy encourages arbitration and that California procedure
was better adapted to further this policy than federal procedure
itself. In addition, the court noted that the defendant lost no rights
by proceeding to arbitration, for the question of arbitrability could be
asserted before the arbitrator.
Although apparently not raised in the case, it should be observed
that finding the local rule consonant with federal policy avoided a
very difficult constitutional question. That question could be pre-
sented in the following case. A plaintiff comes into state court seeking
an order compelling arbitration, or, in the alternative, damages. The
76. See Cheatham & Reese, supra note 55.
77. See text accompanying notes 53-55 supra.
78. Davis v. Wechsler, 263 U.S. 22, 24 (1923).
79. See, e.g., Blue Diamond Coal Co. v. Baker, 375 S.W.2d 699 (Ky. 1964) (ap-
plied state standards of review); Shaw Electric Co. v. IBEW, 422 Pa. 211, 220 A.2d
889 (1966) (appeal from denial of judgment on the pleading); Hines v.. Globe Solvents
Co., 421 Pa. 367, 219 A.2d 695 (1966) (appeal from order refusing arbitration
untimely under state law).
80. 215 Cal. App. 2d 87,29 Cal. Rptr. 829 (1963).
81. 238 U.S. 507 (1915).
82. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960);
United -Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United
Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
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trial court finds that the issue is not arbitrable and proceeds to con-
sider the damage claim. On appeal from the denial of arbitration the
plaintiff is met by the argument that the state appellate courts lack
jurisdiction to hear appeals from interlocutory orders. Assuming that
federal policy encourages the private settlement of disputes and
prefers an appellate review of the arbitrability question before enter-
ing upon a costly trial; and assuming further that as a matter of state
law it is clear that the appellate court is without jurisdiction to hear
the appeal, the federal constitutional problem is squarely confronted:
does the federal constitution permit Congress or the federal courts to
compel a state court to hear an appeal which, under state law, it is
powerless to entertain? The same constitutional problem would be
presented if a state failed to provide a trial court with jurisdiction
to entertain a suit to enforce a federally-created right. The Second
Employers' Liability Cases83 indicate that state courts must adjudicate
federal claims when their jurisdiction is "appropriate to the occasion."
But there was also further indication that no attempt by Congress to
enlarge or regulate the jurisdiction of state courts was there involved.
McKnett v. St. Louis & S.F. Ry.84 states that a court's jurisdiction is
"appropriate to the occasion" when its ordinary jurisdiction encom-
passes actions similar to the federal right sought to be enforced. In
addition, McKnett points out in dicta that "[t]he power of a State to
determine the limits of jurisdiction of its courts and the character of
the controversies which shall be heard in them is, of course, subject
to the restrictions imposed by the Federal Constitution."m However,
in spite of such language, McKnett also notes that Congress did not
attempt to compel states to enable courts to hear FELA cases.w Other
Supreme Court cases are equally as inconclusive. 87
In spite of the unsettled authority on the issue above, there seems to
be little ground for a state trial court of general jurisdiction to refuse
to hear a 301 suit. It is clear that if within the boundaries of its
"ordinary jurisdiction" a court hears similar cases, it cannot discrimi-
nate against a federally-created right. Since state courts do hear
contract actions generally and have historically entertained suits on
labor contracts, they are compelled to hear 301 suits. However, the
83. 223 U.S. 1, 57 (1911).
84. 292 U.S. 230, 232-33 (1934).
85. Id. at 233.
86. Id.
87. See, e.g., Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U.S. 629 (1935); Kenney v. Supreme Lodge,
Loyal Order of Moose, 252 U.S. 411 (1920). These two cases were actions on state
statutes and involved full faith and credit; however, they employ the reasoning of the
federal rights cases. In Kenney, the Court stated "that a State cannot escape its
constitutional obligations by the simple device of denying jurisdiction . . . to courts
otherwise competent." (Emphasis supplied). 252 U.S. at 415.
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appellate issue is not as easily resolved. On the one hand, it may be
argued that since the state undertook to enforce the federal right at
the trial level, it cannot refuse to provide appellate procedure con-
sistent with federal policy. On the other hand, it can be argued that,
in fact, the state was compelled to hear the suit at the trial level;
that parties claiming federal rights are accorded the same appellate
relief as parties suing on state claims; and that federal power is
lacking to thrust unauthorized jurisdiction upon state appellate courts.
The constitutional question posed in the hypothetical case can be
avoided by a characterization of the order under appeal as a final
order within the framework of the federal right, and it seems clear
that the Supreme Court has competence to make this characteriza-
tion. In the event the problem is raised in a different context and
cannot be solved as suggested, it would appear that state courts
must accept appeals under the authority of federal law in order to
avoid prejudicing a federal right. After all, appellate machinery exists
in all states, and no greater intrusion upon state sovereignty is caused
by requiring state courts to hear federal appeals than that which
occurs when statutorily incompetent state trial courts are required to
hear federal claims analogous to state claims which they are com-
petent to entertain.
Notwithstanding the preceding, for the most part no problem will
be presented by the application of state procedures and rules to
appeals in 301 suits. However, following the example of Laufnan,
state tribunals must be alert to possible conflict. There is a presump-
tion that state courts may apply their own rules to such appeals,
but once the local rule is ascertained, its affect upon the substance of
the federal right must be measured, and if substantial prejudice is
found, the local rule must give way to federal policy.
IV. ARBITBATION STATUTES
A. Generally
A large number of 301 suits seek either specific enforcement of an
agreement to arbitrate or enforcement of an arbitrator's award.
Congress has enacted a general arbitration statute,88 but some ques-
tion exists concerning its applicability to collective bargaining con-
tracts.89 In addition, most states have arbitration statutes, many of
which purport to cover collective bargaining agreements.90 These
statutes delineate the procedure for specifically enforcing agreements
88. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1964).
89. See text accompanying notes 111-27 infra.
90. See note 128 infra for a listing of these statutes.
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to arbitrate, and the question arises to what extent, if any, they may
be employed by state tribunals entertaining 301 suits. At least three
alternative solutions appear. First, if the federal act is deemed in-
applicable to labor contracts, the approach taken in Hoosier with
regard to statutes of limitations could be adopted. Under this federal-
law-chooses-state-law approach both the state and federal courts in a
given state would apply the same arbitration procedure. Second, it
could be held that the federal arbitration statute governs in state as
well as federal courts, which, of course, would require a finding that
a uniform procedure is needed. Finally, it could be determined that
although the federal statute covers labor contracts, arbitration proce-
dure is not a subject requiring uniformity, and thus the state would
be free to employ local procedures, while the federal courts follow the
congressional enactment. In order to consider which is the likely
alternative, some attention must be directed to the nature of the
arbitral process as well as to the statutes.
It is not clear from the cases precisely how arbitration procedures
should be characterized for these purposes. For the most part, the
parties to state proceedings, at least, appear to have assumed the
applicability of state statutes, and consequently, there is little dis-
cussion to be found on this matter in section 301 cases.91 On the other
hand, arbitration statutes have been characterized in other types of
litigation, and perhaps an examination of these cases will be fruitful.
Two Supreme Court cases appear to have reached contradictory
results. Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co.9 2 considered whether
the New York Arbitration Act could be applied in the New York
courts to enforce an arbitration clause in a charter party, or whether
application of the statute to maritime contracts would constitute state
interference with federal jurisdiction under article III. Holding that
New York could apply its statute, Mr. Justice Brandeis stated that
"the [s]tate, having concurrent jurisdiction, is free to adopt such
remedies, and to attach to them such incidents, as it sees fit. New
York, therefore, had the power.., to compel parties... to specifically
perform an agreement for arbitration, which is valid by the general
maritime law....-9 In reaching this result, the majority recognized
that under existing admiralty law an executory arbitration agreement,
though valid, could not be specifically enforced because admiralty
courts lacked equity powers.94 The Court followed the characteriza-
91. See, e.g., Brewery Workers v. Maier Brewing Co., 63 L.R.R.M. 2295 (Cal. Super.
Ct. 1966); O'Brien v. Curran, 106 N.H. 252,209 A.2d 723 (1965).
92. 264 U.S. 109 (1924).
93. Id. at 124.
94. Id. at 123. See The Eclipse, 135 U.S. 599 (1890).
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tion of the New York courts95 that limitations and procedures in the
enforcement of valid agreements to arbitrate were part of the law of
remedies. 6 Thus, the question having been characterized as proce-
dural for purposes of concurrent state jurisdiction in admiralty, it
was thought that the United States Arbitration Act9? would be
available for the specific enforcement of a promise to arbitrate in a
diversity suit. However, Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co.9 reached a
contrary result. The case involved a breach of contract action re-
moved from a Vermont court to federal court. The contract had an
arbitration clause, but there was no showing that the agreement
involved a maritime transaction or one affecting interstate com-
merce,99 thus, jurisdiction was based solely upon diversity. On the
basis of the New York Arbitration Statute, the defendant sought a
stay of the action pending arbitration. The district court denied the
stay following Vermont law, which adhered to the common law rule
of denying enforcement to executory agreements to arbitrate. The
federal act also has a provision which would have allowed a stay
pending arbitration, 100 and the court of appeals characterized the
question of enforcing the arbitration agreement as procedural and
applied the federal statute. Reversing the court of appeals, the
Supreme Court held the federal act inapplicable to this diversity
action, indicating that to do otherwise would raise a serious constitu-
tional question. 10' Mr. Justice Douglas stated that "[i]f the federal
court allows arbitration where the state court would disallow it, the
outcome of litigation might depend on the courthouse where suit is
brought. For the remedy by arbitration, whatever its merits or
shortcomings, substantially affects the cause of action created by the
State."10 2 Bernhardt does not refer to the Red Cross Line decision,
although the characterization of arbitration in the two cases conflicts.
An attempt to distinguish Bernhardt from Red Cross Line has been
made on the basis that in the former the controlling substantive law,
in practical effect, denied the validity of executory arbitration agree-
95. See Meacham v. Jamestown, F. & C. R.R., 211 N.Y. 346, 105 N.E. 653 (1914)
(concurring opinion).
96. 264 U.S. at 118.
97. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1964).
98. 350 U.S. 198 (1956).
99. The applicability of the United States Arbitration Act is specifically limited to
maritime contracts, or those in transactions affecting commerce excluding such "con-
tracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers
engaged in foreign or interstate commerce." 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1964).
100. 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1964).
101. 350 U.S. at 202.
102., 350 U.S. at 203.
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ments. 10 3 This distinction appears to be unfounded, for in fact the
state of the controlling substantive law in both cases was identical.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter pointed out in the concurring decision that
the district court denied the stay, not because Vermont law invalidated
such clauses, but because, although recognizing their binding force,
local law refused to compel specific performance. 104 That was the
state of maritime law as Mr. Justice Brandeis understood it at the
time of the Red Cross Line decision.10 5 So it appears that the proce-
dural characterization used in the latter case has been deprived of
its vitality by the Bernhardt decision. However, it does not follow, as
some writers have apparently assumed,'16 that if Bernhardt devitalizes
the Red Cross Line rationale, state arbitration statutes are inapplica-
ble to 301 suits. Furthermore, distinguishing Bernhardt cannot revive
the Red Cross Line procedural characterization, at least with respect
to specifically enforcing arbitration agreements in collective bargain-
ing contracts. Lincoln Mills is clear on the point that the question of
whether the agreement to arbitrate will be enforced is a federal law
matter.10 7 What Lincoln Mills leaves open, and on what Bernhardt
gives less guidance than might at first be assumed, is how the arbitra-
tion promise is to be enforced. In remanding the case to the district
court for further proceedings, the Bernhardt Court took specific note
of the respondent's argument that New York law, not Vermont law,
was governing. 0 8 In recommending this argument for the district
court's consideration, the Court appears to have assumed that its
validity would result in specific enforcement of the promise to arbi-
trate under the New York Arbitration Act. This assumption could be
read to indicate that the governing substantive law carries with it the
arbitration procedures to be applied were it not for the fact that
earlier in the opinion the Court had held that the federal act was
inapplicable by its own terms.109 Accordingly, there is nothing in the
Bernhardt rationale indicating that it would be improper to apply
the federal statute in a diversity suit involving an arbitration agree-
ment of the type the statute reaches." 0 On the basis of the preceeding
103. See, Firsig, The Minnesota Uniform Arbitration Act and the Lincoln Mills Casc,
42 MNN. L. REv. 333, 365 (1958).
104. 350 U.S. at 206.
105. 264 U.S. at 123.
106. Pirsig, supra note 103 at 362-65, 374. The author proceeds at great length
to distinguish Red Cross Line from Bernhardt, and relies upon Red Cross Line when
stating under what conditions he feels the state arbitration statute vould be applicable.
107. 353 U.S. at 456. The Court's language makes clear that the correctness of
the Red Cross Line characterization has been rendered moot by § 301.
108. 350 U.S. at 205.
109. 350 U.S. at 200.
110. It should be noted that Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in the concurring opinion,
took the position that since the act did not obviously apply to diversity cases, he
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authority, then, the question is still open as to whether state arbitra-
tion statutes can be applied in 301 suits brought in state courts.
B. United States Arbitration Act
At the instigation of the American Bar Association, the United
States Arbitration Act was enacted in 1925 to overcome judicial
hostility toward executory agreements to arbitrate. Due to vigorous
lobbying by the Seaman's Union,"' the bill contains exceptions which
have led to conflicting results concerning its application to arbitration
clauses in collective bargaining contracts. Section 1 makes the act
applicable to maritime transactions and to arbitration clauses con-
tained in contracts "evidencing a transaction involving commerce,"
but excepts from its coverage "contracts of employment of seamen,
railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign
or interstate commerce."" 2 Three arguments have been put forward
to support the proposition that collective bargaining agreements are
not excluded by this exception.
One argument which had enjoyed vitality for a time was rejected
by the Bernhardt case. The contention was that, since the various
sections of the act were self-contained and need not be read together,
the exclusionary clause was applicable only to the definition of com-
merce. Therefore, for example, section 3 of the act, which authorizes
a stay of court proceedings pending arbitration, could be applied to
a collective bargaining contract, since that section omitted any refer-
ence to commerce." 3 However, in Bernhardt, the Supreme Court held
that sections 1 and 2 define the field in which Congress was legislat-
ing, and that section 3, as part of the complete regulatory scheme, was
subject to the same limitations as sections 1 and 2.
A second argument makes a distinction between contracts of
employment which give rise to individual jobs and collective bargain-
ing contracts which merely establish the terms and conditions of
employment." 4 The position taken is that the exception was de-
would hold it inapplicable to all diversity cases in an effort to avoid the "serious con-
stitutional question" that would otherwise arise. 350 U.S. at 208. For an excellent
opinion which rejects this view, see Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc.,
271 F.2d 402 (1959). Judge Medina, in that case, takes the view that not only does
the statute apply in diversity cases, but it declares a rule of national law to be
applied to arbitration agreements affecting commerce or maritime affairs and enforceable
in state or federal courts.
111. Note, Lincoln Mills: Labor Arbitration and Federal-State Relations, 57 CoLum.
L. REv. 1123, 1124 (1957).
112. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1964).
113. Watkins v. Hudson Coal Co., 151 F.2d 311, (3d Cir. 1945).
114. Local 205, UEW v. General Elec. -Co., 233 F.2d 85 (1st Cir. 1956) aff'd,




signed to prevent specific performance of individual contracts, and
was not intended to apply to collective bargaining contracts which
should, instead, be viewed as trade agreements.
The final argument made relies upon the principle of ejusdem
generis and maintains that the exception is limited to a narrow class
of workers actually working in commerce, as distinguished from those
whose work merely affects commerce.
115
On the other hand, several circuits have taken the position that
from legislative history, it is clear that collective bargaining contracts
were intended to be covered and that the exception is as broad as the
coverage of the act.116 The Fifth Circuit took this view in Lincoln
Mills,117while the First Circuit, in two cases" 8 which were reviewed
along with that decision, had held that collective bargaining agree-
ments could be enforced under the arbitration statute. However,
the majority of the Supreme Court did not discuss the statute in any
of the opinions, and this led Mr. Justice Frankfurter to observe in
dissent that the Court's silence could be taken as implicitly ruling the
arbitration statute inapplicable." 9 Subsequent decisions have not
unanimously accepted this view of the Lincoln Mills result, and the
conflict continues.2 0
It may be that the dispute regarding the applicability of the United
States Arbitration Act is largely academic. Decisions under 301 are
setting standards for enforcing arbitration independently of the 1925
statute.121 Language in General Electric Co. v. Local 205, UEW'22
may indicate that the Supreme Court views the statute as inapplicable
under 301. In affirming enforcement of an arbitration clause in a
labor contract on the authority of the arbitration act, the Court
stated: "We follow in part a different path than the Court of
115. Tenney Eng'r, Inc. v. Local 437, UEW, 207 F.2d 450 (3d Cir. 1953). This
view is apparently limited to the Third Circuit and was expressly rejected by tho
Fourth Circuit .in UEW v. Miller Metal Prods., Inc., 215 F.2d 221 (1954).
116. See, e.g., United Steelworkers v. Galland-Henning Mfg. Co., 241 F.2d 323
(7th Cir. 1957); Lincoln Mills v. Textile Workers Union, 230 F.2d 81 (5th Cir.
1956), rev'd on other grounds, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
. 117. Lincoln Mills v. Textile Workers Union, 230 F.2d 81 (5th Cir. 1956), read
on other grounds, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
118. Goodall-Sanford, Inc. v. Local 1802, Textile Workers, 233 F.2d 104 (1st Cir.
1956), aff'd, 353 U.S. 550 (1957); Local 205, UEW v. General Elec. Co., 233 F.2d
85 (1st Cir. 1956), aff'd 353 U.S. 547 (1957).
119. 353 U.S. at 466-67.
120. See, e.g., Pietro Scalzitti Co. v. Operating Eng'rs, Local 150, 351 F.2d 576
(7th Cir. 1965).
121. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960);
United Steelworkers v. Warrior Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steel-
workers v: American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
122. 353 U.S. 547 (1957).
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Appeals, though we reach the same result."123 The same language,
however, has been read as confirmation that the federal statute should
be employed by federal courts as the "guiding analogy" under 301.124
If the federal act is not applicable per se, it is certainly part of the
body of federal law to which courts may look when devising standards
to apply under 301.mz Both the arbitration act and national labor
policy 26 attempt to encourage the private resolution of disputes. The
procedures specified by the statute are designed to facilitate enforce-
ment of arbitration agreements and to limit judicial review of
awards.'2 This harmony between the federal arbitration act and
national labor policy, together with the silence of the majority in
Lincoln Mills, indicates that the act, or at least its "non-substantive"
aspects, has not been absorbed under 301. This view would allow the
federal courts to apply the statute as a "guiding analogy" in 301
suits without attempting to determine whether they were applying
"substantive" or "non-substantive" law, while, at the same time,
leaving the state courts free to look to their own sources of rules
when confronted with questions not affected with the need for
uniformity. Several reasons commend this interpretation of the
somewhat confusing debate concerning the applicability of the federal
arbitration statute. While in toto adoption of the congressional
enactment as national law to be applied by state and federal courts
would assure protection of the basic policies announced in Lincoln
Mills, it would demand uniformity in areas not required by labor
policy at the sacrifice of the state courts' interest in applying their own
familiar procedures whenever possible. Ruling the federal statute
completely inapplicable to collective bargaining contracts and employ-
ing a federal-law-chooses-state-law approach would be unsatisfactory,
because some states have no arbitration statute. The suggested ap-
proach allows for selective absorption as national law of those aspects
of the federal statute requiring uniformity, while still permitting
state and federal courts to go their- respective ways on issues not
requiring uniform resolution.
123. 353 U.S. at 548.
124. Comment, The Applicability of State Arbitration Statutes to Proceedings Sub-
ject to LMRA Section 301, 27 Omo ST. L.J. 692, 704-05 (1966).
125. See, Local 1416, IAM v. Jostens, Inc., 250 F. Supp. 496 (1966).
126. 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1964).
127. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1964). Section 2 makes arbitration agreements valid,
irrevocable and enforceable; § 3 permits stay of action pending arbitration; § 4
authorizes applications for specific enforcement and provides for summary disposition of
such preliminary issues as contract vel non; § 5 allows for court appointment of an
arbitrator in the event the parties fail to appoint one; § 6 provides that applications
under the act shall receive motion treatment; § 7 authorizes subpoenas; § 10 limits
the grounds for vacation; and § 11 specifies grounds for modification.
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C. The State Acts
The tenacity of judicial hostility toward arbitration led many
states as well as Congress to enact enabling statutes.128 The details
and coverage of these laws vary, but for the most part, they contain
similar legislative objectives. The basic purpose is, of course, to
allow parties to adopt private dispute-settling mechanisms that will
not be defeated by courts jealous of their jurisdiction. To achieve
this object the statutes employ some or all of the following provisions:
(1) a declaration that agreements to arbitrate present or future
disputes are valid, irrevocable, and enforceable; (2) a definition of
the scope of the arbitrator's authority; (3) an authorization detailing
the grounds and procedure for obtaining a stay of action pending
arbitration; (4) a provision for the appointment of arbitrators in
the event the parties fail to do so; (5) a grant of subpoena power to
the arbitrator; (6) a specification of the methods of enforcing the
agreements; and (7) a detailing of the grounds and procedures for
modifying, vacating or confirming awards. It can be seen that some
of the stated provisions, such as those validating arbitration clauses,
are calculated to achieve the same ends sought by national labor
policy, while the harmony of others, such as those listing grounds for
vacating awards, with 301 will depend on their details. Having con-
cluded that under existing law state courts are free to apply whatever
128. ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 829-44 (1960); An=x. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-501 to
1517 (Supp. 1967); AmK. STAT. ANN. §§ 34-501 to 510 (1962); CAL. CIv. PROC. §§
1280-94.2 (Supp. 1967); COLO. RULES Civ. Pnoc. 109; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§
52-408 to -424 (1959); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 682.01-.22 (Supp. 1968); CA. CODE
ANN. §§ 7-201 to -224 (1936); HAWAwu REv. LAws §§ 188-1 to -15 (1955); IDAxio
CODE ANN. §§ 7-901 to -910 (1948); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 10, §§ 1-30, 101-23 (Smith-
Hurd 1966); IND. STAT. ANN. §§ 3-201 to -226 (1968); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 679.1-.18
(1950), as amended, (Supp. 1968); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 5-201 to -213, 301 to -310
(1964); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 417.010-.040 (1963); LA. REV. STAT. §§ 9.4201-.4217
(1951); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, §§ 951-60 (1964), as amended, (Supp. 1967);
MD. ANN. CODE art. 7, §§ 1-23 (1968); MAss. ANN. LAWs ch. 251, §§ 1-19 (1968);
MIcH. STAT. ANN. §§ 27A.5001-5035 (1962); MiNN. STAT. ANN. §§ 572.08-.30
(Supp. 1967); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 279-97 (1956); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 435.010-280
(1952); MONT. REv. CODES ANN. §§ 93-201--i to -10 (1964); NED. REV. STAT.
§§ 25-2103 to -2120 (1965); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 38.010-.240 (1959); NH. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 542.1-10 (1955); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:24-1 to -11 (1952); N.M.
STAT. ANN. §§ 22-3-1 to -8 (1954); N.Y. Civ. PmAc. LAW 7501-14 (McKinney
1963), as amended, (Supp. 1967); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-544 to -567 (1953);
N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 32-29-01 to "-21 (1960); Omo REv. CODE §§ 2711.01-.15
(1964); Orx. REv. STAT. 33.210-.340 (1967); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, §§ 1-209 (1963),
as amended, (Supp. 1967); R.I. GEN. LAWs ANN. §§ 10-3-1 to -20 (1957), as
amended, (Supp. 1967); S.C. CODF'ANN. §§ 10-1901 to -1905 (1962); TENN. CODE
ANN. §§ 23-501 to -519 (1955);" TEX. REv. CIV. STAT. arts. 224-49 (1959), as
amended, (Supp. 1967); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-31-1 to -22 (1953); VA. CODE ANN.
§§ 8-503 to -507 (1957), as amended, (Supp. 1968); WAsH. REv. CODE §§ 7.04.010
to -.220 (1961); W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 55-10-1 to -8 (1966); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§
298.01-.18 (1958); Wyo. STAT. ANN. §§ 1-1048.1-.21 (Supp. 1967). '
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arbitration procedures they wish, so long as they are consistent with
301, the next step is to measure the effect various provisions would
have on labor policy if applied in state court 301 suits.
1. Statutes that exclude labor agreements from coverage.-Several
statutes specifically exclude labor arbitration clauses from their cover-
age,'2 while at least one is, by its own terms, inapplicable to agree-
ments covered by the provisions of the federal arbitration act. 30 By
exempting contracts subject to the federal act, it is not clear whether
this statute becomes inapplicable to collective bargaining contracts,
for, as previously noted, considerable doubt exists as to the scope
of the federal statute. It is clear, however, that neither such a clause
nor a general exclusion of labor contracts from the arbitration statute
can prohibit state courts from enforcing 301 arbitration clauses.1
3 '
Whether state courts in suits under section 301 must apply their
arbitration statute to the extent permitted by federal law is a
matter of local law; it does not follow that such a statute has to be
applicable by its own terms in order to serve as a useful guide to
settling 301 disputes. Courts in states whose statutes exclude collec-
tive bargaining contracts will be called upon to enforce arbitration
agreements under 301, and reference to the state arbitration statute as
a source of procedure would be consistent with the role accorded the
federal act by some courts. 32
2. Stay of Action; Stay of Arbitration.-Most state arbitration
statutes provide a procedure for staying the trial of an action pend-
ing arbitration. 33 Such a provision is certainly consistent with labor
policy, and under Lincoln Mills state courts have the power to stay
actions even if such a provision is not found in the local arbitration
statute. Failure to do so would, in effect, deny specific performance
of the arbitration agreement.
129. The following states exclude labor: Arizona, Maryland (unless parties expressly
select statute), Michigan, New Hampshire, Oregon, Rhode Island, Washington, and
Wisconsin. For full citations see note 128 supra. In addition, the following states have
no arbitration statute: Alaska, Delaware, District of Columbia, Oklahoma, South
Dakota and Vermont. Colorado has no statute, but provides for arbitration in its rules
of civil procedure. See CoLo. RtLus Civ. Pnoc. 109.
130. LA. Rayv. STAT. ANN. § 9:4216 (1951). The statute is inapplicable to "con-
tracts of employment of labor or to contracts for arbitration which are controlled by
valid legislation of the United States .... ." The "contracts of employment of labor"
language may make the issue of the United States Arbitration Act's applicability moot,
but it is susceptible to the same type of limiting construction which some courts have
put on the federal act.
131. See text accompanying note 11 supra.
132. See, Local 1416, IAM v. Jostens, Inc., 250 F. Supp. 496 (1966).
133. These states are: Alabama, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida,
Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Texas, Washington,
Wisconsin, and Wyoming. For complete citations, see note 128 supra.
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In addition to a stay of action, some state statutes allow for a stay
of arbitration on certain limited grounds. It is not clear what the
effect of such a provision is, but if it is to block arbitration where
the party has not agreed to arbitrate, 134 then certainly it is unneces-
sary, for a party cannot be compelled to arbitrate an issue which he
has not agreed to submit to arbitration.1 1 It should be noted that
state courts may only grant stays sparingly, for with regard to
labor contracts, all doubts are to be resolved in favor of arbitration. 131
3. Subpoena Power.-The United States Arbitration Act 137 and the
majority of the states138 grant arbitrators the power, with enforce-
ment in the courts, to compel the attendance of witnesses and the
production of books and records. It would seem that such provisions
are calculated to increase the effectiveness of the arbitration proceed-
ing, and the view has been taken that the power should be inferred
from 301 itself. 39 Regardless of whether 301 demands the grant of
the subpoena power, courts should not hesitate to allow subpoenas
in states whose statutes grant the power. It is true that if some states
grant subpoena power while others do not, arbitration will be more
effective in the former states than in the latter. However, it seems
that this argument really addresses itself to the question of whether
the power should be implied under 301 as a matter of federal law
rather than to the question of whether provisions in state statutes
granting subpoena power may be validly applied under 301. Assum-
ing applicability, a court enforcing a subpoena in a 301 suit must
consider the effect of the enforcement in the light of labor policy.
There may be some matters of privilege and permissible scope of
materials subject to the power which would have to be viewed with
labor policy in mind.
4. Vacation or Modification of the Award.-The provisions in most
134. See, e.g., N.Y. Cir. PRAc. LAW § 7503 (McKinney Supp. 1967), "A party ...
may apply to stay arbitration on the ground that a valid agreement was not made or
has not been complied with ....
135. See, United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582
(1960).
136. Id. at 582-83.
137. 9 U.S.C. § 7 (1964).
138. The states making provision for subpoena power on the part of the arbitrator
include: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois,
Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, Missouri, Mississippi,
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Washington,
Wisconsin, and Wyoming. For full citations, see note 128 supra.
139. Comment, The Applicability of State Arbitration Statutes to Proceedings Sub-
ject to LMRA Section 301, 27 Omo ST. L.J. 692, 707 (1966).
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statutes'4" specifying grounds for vacating or modifying awards are
designed to limit the scope of review.141 Limited review is consistent
with the federal policy of according finality to the arbitrator's award,
but certainly the specific limitations must be measured against the
standard of 301. For example, a state provision not permitting the
vacation of awards obtained by fraud could not be consistent with
federal labor policy. It has been suggested that rules governing
review be deemed substantive for the purposes of 301.14 Such rules
do go to the heart of the policy favoring arbitration, and a lack of
uniformity in this area could affect bargaining table views of arbitra-
tion clauses from state to state. Surely, states should not feel as free
to apply local rules in reviewing awards as they would in more
"procedural" areas such as pleading. However, given the embryonic
state of the substantive law under 301, it is submitted that state
courts in search of a source from which to devise a federal rule
governing review of arbitrators' awards can find a helpful reference
in state arbitration statutes.
5. Other Provisions.-As noted above, most state statutes have
sections declaring that arbitration agreements are valid, irrevocable,
and enforceable; sections defining the scope of the arbitrator's author-
ity; and sections providing for the court appointment of arbitrators.
With regard to 301 suits, these provisions seem to be superfluous.
Lincoln Mills makes arbitration clauses specifically enforceable; and
the scope of the arbitrator's authority has been limited by federal
law to the interpretation and application of the collective bargaining
agreement. 43 Finally, court appointment of arbitrators would seem
a necessary corollary to specific enforcement of arbitration clauses.
If the parties entered into an arbitration agreement, they obviously
anticipated that an arbitrator would be chosen. If his selection by the
parties has failed for some reason, unwillingness on the part of the
court to appoint one would frustrate the agreement of the parties. At
140. These states have such provisions: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California,
Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisi-
ana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana,
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, West
Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
141. CAL. CIV. PRoc. CODE: § 1286.2 (Supp. 1967), for example, lists the following
grounds for vacating awards: (1) fraud; (2) corruption; (3) prejudice; (4) abuse of
power; (5) refusal to postpone upon good cause shown; or (6) refusal to hear material
evidence.
142. Note, Lincoln Mills: Labor Arbitration pnd Federal-State Relations, 57 CoLum.
L. REv. 1123, 1135 (1957).




least one court has taken the view that the policy of encouraging
arbitration dictates that the court effectuate the basic intent of the
parties by supplying an arbitrator. 44
V. SOi REMEIAL PROBLEMS
A. Enjoining Strikes in Breach of Collective
Bargaining Agreements
This section considers whether state courts entertaining suits under
section 301 may enjoin strikes in breach of collective bargaining
agreements. 145 With respect to the federal courts, this question was
resolved in Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson,146 where the Supreme
Court held that section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act 47 prohibits
the issuance of injunctions to enforce no-strike agreements. The issue
at this juncture is whether the prohibitions of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act are now applicable to state courts under 301 or whether the
operation of that act is to be confined to the federal courts. The
courts considering this issue have reached conflicting results and
there appears to be reason and authority in support of a number of
views.' 48
In McCarroll v. Los Angeles County District Council of Carpen-
ters,149 Justice Traynor, speaking for the majority of the California
144. See, Deaton Truck Line, Inc. v. Teamsters Local 612, 314 F.2d 418 (5th Cir.
1962), which accepted this view.
145. For general discussions of this question see Aaron, Strikes in Breach of Collec-
tive Agreements: Some Unanswered Questions, 63 CoLuM. L. REv. 1027 (1963);
Janofsky & Vaughn, Affirmative Role of State Courts to Enjoin Strikes in Breach of
Collective Bargaining Agreements, 7 B.C. IND. & Comr. L. REv. 869 (1966); Lesnick,
State-Court Injunctions and the Federal Common Law of Labor Contracts: Beyond
Norris-LaGuardia, 79 HArv. L. REv. 757 (1966); Stem, The Norris-LaGuardia Act
and State Court Injunctions Against Strikes in Breach of a Collective Bargaining
Agreement Under Section 301: Accommodation vs. Incompatibility, 39 TEmpLu L.Q.
65 (1965).
146. 370 U.S. 195 (1962).
147. 47 Stat. 70 (1932), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1964). Section 4 of
the act provides that: "No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue
any temporary restraining order or permanent injunction in any case involving or
growing out of a labor dispute to prohibit any person or persons participating or
interested in such dispute [as these terms are herein defined] from doing, whether
singly or in concert, any of the following acts: (a) Ceasing or refusing to perform
any work or to remain in any relation of employment. .. "
148. See, e.g., Avco Corp. v. Lodge 735, IAM, 376 F.2d 337 (6th Cir.), cert,
granted, 389 U.S. 819 (1967) (states cannot issue injunction under 301); Ameri-
can Dredging Co. v. Local 25, Operating Eng'rs, 338 F.2d 837 (3d Cir. 1964), cert.
denied, 380 U.S. 935 (1965) (states can issue injunctions under 301); McCarroll v.
Los Angeles Co. Dist. Council of Carpenters, 49 Cal. 2d 45, 315 P.2d 322 (1957), cert.
denied, 355 U.S. 932 (1958); Dugdale Constr. Co. v. Operative Plasterers Ass'n, Local
538, 257 Iowa 997, 135 N.W.2d 656 (1965); Shaw Elec. Co. v. IBEW, 418 Pa. 1,
208 A.2d 769 (1965).
149. Cal. 2d 45, 315 P.2d 322 (1957), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 932 (1958).
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Supreme Court, concluded that the restrictions of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act are not applicable to state courts entertaining suits un-
der section 301. Questioning the power of Congress to restrain state
courts in exercising their remedial powers, he found no congressional
intention to limit the power of state courts to grant injunctions. It
"would give . . . an ironic twist [to the purpose of section 301 to
hold] that the actual effect of the legislation was to abolish in state
courts equitable remedies that had been available, and leave an
employer in a worse position in respect to the effective enforcement
of his contract than he was before the enactment of section 301."150
This reasoning is supported by the decision of the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court in Shaw Electric Co. v. IBEW. 15' The court stated:
It is true that the (Norris-LaGuardia) Act expresses a congressional policy
against injunctions, but only injunctions granted by federal courts. Con-
gressional enactment of Section 301, without amendment of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act, with Congress fully aware of state court remedies, strongly
indicates reafirmance of existing federal labor policies which limit the
injunctive jurisdiction of federal courts, but which do not attempt to limit
that of state courts. 152
While the views expressed in Shaw and McCarroll are appealing,
there is equally persuasive authority which indicates that the prohibi-
tions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act are a matter of federal law to
which the states must adhere. 53 In Avco Corp. v. Lodge 735, IAM,'5
the Sixth Circuit held that "the remedies available in State Courts
are limited to the remedies available under Federal law.' 55 Reason-
ing that Sinclair reinforced the status of the Norris-LaGuardia Act
as part of the nation's labor legislation, the court found that "[tihough
Section 4 specifically applies only to Federal Courts, [it] was never-
theless, a clear declaration of congressional policy against enjoining
peaceful picketing which we must now follow and apply as part
of Federal labor law."1' The court also indicated that this is an area
requiring uniform development of the law lest the "State Courts ...
become the preferred forum for adjusting breaches of no-strike clauses
in collective bargaining agreements ..
150. 49 Cal. 2d at 63-64, 315 P.2d at 332.
151. 418 Pa. 1, 208 A.2d 769 (1965).
152. Id. at 12-13, 208 A.2d at 775-76.
153. See Avco Corp. v. Lodge 735, IAM, 376 F.2d 337 (6th Cir.), cert granted, 389
U.S. 819 (1967). See also Aaron, supra note 145 at 1035.
154. 376 F.2d 337 (6th Cir.), cert. granted, 389 U.S. 819 (1967).
155. Id. at 343.
156. Id. at 342.
157. Id. at 343.
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On appeal the Supreme Court considered only the narrow question
of whether the Norris-LaGuardia Act's restriction on the jurisdiction
of the federal courts to issue labor injunctions prevented the removal
of 301 suits from state courts when only injunctive relief was re-
quested.'- 8 In holding that the action was properly removed to the
federal court under the Removal Act,159 the Court stated that the
"nature of the relief available after jurisdiction attaches is ... different
from the question whether there is jurisdiction to adjudicate the
controversy."' 60 Although noting that the court of appeals had stated
in dictum that "the remedies available in State Courts are limited to
the remedies available under Federal law," the Supreme Court
expressly reserved decision on this question. Thus, state court judges
are still confronted with the question of whether they have the power
to issue injunctive relief in suits under section 301.
The various positions taken on this issue result from the conflict
between, on the one hand, the congressional intent in enacting section
301 to increase the effectiveness of enforcing labor agreements, and,
on the other hand, the Hoosier policy of maintaining uniformity in the
resolution of issues which affect the smooth functioning of the collec-
tive bargaining and dispute settlement processes. Under the present
decisional framework this conflict cannot be resolved. If the policy
of uniformity is sought to be effectuated, then state courts must be
deprived of the power to issue labor injunctions, thereby frustrating
the effective enforcement of collective bargaining agreements. On
the other hand, if state courts are permitted to issue no-strike injunc-
tions, there would be a sacrifice of uniformity. Furthermore, even if
uniformity is sacrificed, it is doubtful whether, in light of Avco, the
effective enforcement of collective bargaining agreements can be
enhanced. Conceding the power of state courts to issue no-strike
injunctions, the decision in Avco clearly establishes the defendant's
right to remove the action to federal court where he may seek
dissolution of the injunction. While noting that there was no ques-
tion of the district court's power to dissolve a state court injunction
after removal,161 the Supreme Court in Avco expressly reserved deci-
sion on whether the district court is required to dissolve the injunc-
tion under the authority of Sinclair.162 If it must do so, permitting
state courts to issue injunctive relief under section 301 will merely
add an additional procedural step to such 301 actions. Even if the
158. Avco Corp. v. Lodge 735, IAM, 390 U.S. 557 (1968).
159. 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1964).
160. 390 U.S. at 561.
161. See 28 U.S.C. § 1450 (1964).
162. 390 U.S. at 561 n.4.
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district court, under certain circumstances, is permitted to allow state
court no-strike injunctions to continue in effect, plaintiffs will still
institute their suits in state courts where injunctive relief is available
and defendants will remove them to federal court in the hope that the
injunction will be dissolved-again creating an additional procedural
step.
It can be seen that favoring effective enforcement over the policy
of uniformity will lead to an unsatisfactory result. This would tend
to militate toward the preference for the policy of uniformity. How-
ever, such a preference fails to meet the McCarroll objection that in
enacting section 301 Congress sought to enhance the enforcement of
collective bargaining agreements. It is submitted that McCarrolls
interpretatiton of congressional intent was correct.163 Consequently
the proper method of bringing about uniformity is through a change
in the applicable federal law. There are two courses which could be
taken: Congress could repeal the Norris-LaGuardia Act in so far as
it prohibits injunctive enforcement of no-strike agreements'4 or, in
the absence of such congressional action, the Supreme Court could
reconsider and overrule its decision in Sinclair and permit federal
courts to issue no-strike injunctions in limited situations. 65 The
latter approach could be justified along the lines of the Court's deci-
sion in Lincoln Mills regarding the specific enforcement of agree-
ments to arbitrate.'6 It could be said that while the issuance of
no-strike injunctions would appear to fall within the literal terms
of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, the granting of such injunctions is
necessary to achieve section 301's purpose of enhancing the integrity
163. Remarks of Senator Ferguson, 92 CONG. REC. 5708 (1946), cited in Charles
Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1962): "MR. FERGUSON. Mr. President,
there is nothing whatever in the now-being-considered amendment which takes away
from the State courts all the present rights of the State courts to adjudicate the
rights between parties in relation to labor agreements. The amendment merely says
that the Federal courts shall have jurisdiction. It does not attempt to take away the
jurisdiction of the State courts, and the mere fact that the Senator and I disagree does
not change the effect of the amendment. MR. MURRAY. But it authorizes the
employers to bring suit in the Federal courts, if they so desire. MR. FERGUSON.
That is correct. That is all it does. It takes away no jurisdiction of the State courts."
164. See, e.g., Stem, supra note 145.
165. Some commentators seem to think that the Supreme Court correctly decided
Sinclair. See, e.g., Lesnick, supra note 145. Others disagree. See, e.g., Aaron, supra
note 145.
166. In regard to specifically enforcing agreements to arbitrate, the Court employed
the following rationale. It stated that the failure to arbitrate was not one of the
abuses toward which the Norris-LaGuardia Act was directed. Furthermore, the Court
found a congressional policy favoring the settlement of disputes by arbitration in §
8 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act which denies injunctive relief to those who have
failed to make "every reasonable effort" to settle their disputes without court action,
including by way of "voluntary arbitration." Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353
U.S. 448, 458 (1957).
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of the collective bargaining agreement and bringing about industrial
peace. Furthermore, it is arguable that to the extent that section
301's policy of promoting effective enforcement of labor agreements
conflicts with the policy of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, the former
policy must be given effect under normal rules of statutory construc-
tion.
Absent the selection of one of the above alternatives, the question
of whether state courts have the power to issue injunctive relief under
section 301 remains unresolved. In terms of the Hoosier analysis,
the policy of uniformity requires the application of federal law to
this problem. The question now becomes: is that federal law the
Norris-LaGuardia Act and the anti-injunction policy which it evinces?
If so, state courts lack the power to issue injunctive relief in suits
under section 301. However, the same reasons which bring into
question the continuing validity of Sinclair suggest that neither the
Norris-LaGuardia Act nor its anti-injunction policy should be applied
so as to deny the issuance of no-strike injunctions by state courts.
Furthermore, the application of Norris-LaGuardia to the states was
not envisioned at the time of its enactment, nor apparently was this
envisioned at the time of the enactment of section 301.167 Conse-
quently, in the absence of congressional guidance, the policy evi-
denced by the Norris-LaGuardia Act could be regarded as a matter
of federal common law which the judiciary is free to modify and
accommodate to the purposes of section 301. By viewing Norris-
LaGuardia's relationship to state courts in this manner, the Supreme
Court could hold that in light of the purposes of section 301, state
courts can issue no-strike injunctions, but because of the policy evi-
denced by the Norris-LaGuardia Act to control the issuance of labor
injunctions and due to the demand for at least some degree of
uniformity, no-strike injunctions can only be issued under certain
federally-prescribed standards and as a matter of federal law.168
B. Specific Enforcement of Arbitrator's Awards
In an effort to avoid the restrictions of Sinclair, parties faced with
a work stoppage in violation of a labor agreement have first obtained
167. See remarks of Senator Ferguson, 92 CONG. REc. 5708 (1946), cited in, note
163 supra.
168. Of course, the selection of such an approach would suggest that district courts
be permitted under proper circumstances to allow state court no-strike injunctions to
continue in effect upon removal. In determining whether 301 injunctions should be
permitted to continue in effect, the federal courts would be given the opportunity to
fashion federal standards to which state courts must adhere in issuing injunctions.
Thus, the federal courts would not be deprived of their role in this important area
under § 301 and the state courts' power to issue no-strike injunctions would remain
[ VOL. 21
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an arbitrator's back-to-work award, and have initiated an action
under 301 for specific enforcement. Since the decision in Sinclair
the courts in at least two circuits have been presented with the
question of whether the Norris-LaGuardia Act precludes such relief.6 9
In Marine Transport Lines v. Curran,70 a district judge answered
this question in the affirmative. He stated that "whatever the form
of the proceeding," the "court [was] being asked to enjoin a work
stoppage."' 7' Having made this determination he concluded:
In Sinclair the employer sought to enjoin a work stoppage before the
arbitration took place in order to make arbitration effective. Here the
employer seeks to enjoin a work stoppage after the arbitration has taken
place and after the arbitrator has directed that the work stoppage cease.
In my opinion, there is no significant difference between the two situations,
as far as the power of this court is concerned. It inevitably follows from
Sinclair that this court lacks jurisdiction to grant the relief requested
here.' 7 2
The judge admitted that his conclusion "impairs the efficacy of no-
strike and arbitration clauses in collective bargaining agreements,"'
7 3
but he stated that the only remedy for this situation rests with
Congress.
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals reached a contrary result in
Philadelphia Marine Trade Ass'n v. International Longshoremen's
Ass'n, Local 1291.1 4 The court held that the district court's order of
specific enforcement "was not in conflict with the Norris-LaGuardia
Act but completely within the Lincoln Mills and Steelworkers opinions
... and [was] a vital part of the all important enforcement of the
specific performance of the admittedly agreed to arbitration clause in
the labor contract . . . ."17 The court's decision was appealed to
the Supreme Court, where, instead of meeting the issue, the Court
reversed the district court's order for vagueness on the basis of
meaningful. Of greatest importance, however, is the fact that the enforcement of
collective bargaining agreements would remain at least as effective as it was prior to
the enactment of § 301.
169. Philadelphia Marine Trade Ass'n v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, Local
1291, 365 F.2d 295 (3d Cir. 1966), rev'd on other grounds, 389 U.S. 64 (1967);
Marine Transport Lines v. Curran, 65 L.R.R.M. 2095 (D.C.N.Y. 1967). This question
was also involved in Gulf & South American Steamship Co. v. National Maritime
Union, 360 F.2d 63 (5th Cir. 1966), but the court disposed of the matter by stating
that the issue in dispute was not arbitrable and that the no-strike issue alone could
not serve as a basis for the arbitrator's jurisdiction to grant a back-to-work award.
170. 65 L.R.R.M. 2095 (D.C.N.Y. 1967).
171. 65 L.R.R.M. at 2097.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. 365 F.2d 295 (3d Cir. 1966), re'd on other grounds, 389 U.S. 64 (1967).
175. Id. at 299-300.
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FEDEwiAL RULE OF CivIL PROCEDURE 65(d), which provides specific
standards that must be met by "[e]very order granting an injunction
and every restraining order . . ." Reserving the question whether
the order was an "injunction" within the meaning of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act, the Court held that "it was an equitable decree com-
pelling obedience under the threat of contempt and was therefore an
'order granting an injunction' within the meaning of Rule 65 (d)."17
In a separate opinion, Mr. Justice Douglas stated that "[i]f the
order of the District Court is an 'injunction' within the meaning of
Rule 65(d), then [he failed] to see why it [was] not an 'injunction'
within the meaning of the Norris-LaGuardia Act."177 He reasoned
that once the order is held to-be an injunction, "the District Court
on remand would likely consider Sinclair, which is not overruled,
controlling and apply it to preclude the issuance of another order."
78
His wish was apparently to reconsider the wisdom of the decision in
Sinclair, for he stated that the Court "should not set ... on a path
that may well lead to the eventual reaffirmation of the principles of
that case." 79
Considering the issue in the abstract, it would appear that under
the rationale of Hoosier the specific enforcement of back-to-work
awards is a matter demanding uniformity and should consequently
be governed by federal law. Whether an arbitrator's back-to-work
award can be specifically enforced would definitely concern the
parties at the bargaining table and affect the settlement of disputes
under collective bargaining agreements. 180 Unfortunately, this ques-
tion cannot be considered in the abstract, for the possible applica-
bility of Sinclair may once again bring about a situation in which
the doctrine of uniformity gives rise to a conflict with the intent
of Congress in enacting section 301 to promote the effective enforce-
ment of labor agreements. This is similar to the problem which
has arisen in regard to the issuance of no-strike injunctions,'8 ' except
in this instance, the Supreme Court has not specifically held that
federal courts are precluded by the Norris-LaGuardia Act from
issuing specific enforcement of awards.
There are several courses of action which could be taken in regard
to the question under discussion. The Supreme Court could limit
its holding in Sinclair to the issuance of no-strike injunctions prior
176. 389 U.S. at 75.
177. Id. at 77, (1966) (Mr. Justice Douglas, dissenting).
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. See Kirkwood, The Enforcement of Collective Bargaining Contracts-A Sum-
mary, 15 LAB. L.J. 111 (1964).
181. See notes 163-66 supra and accompanying text.
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to arbitration on the ground that the employer can at that time seek
specific enforcement of the arbitration agreement, under which the
dispute may be resolved without using a weapon as potent as an
injunction. It could then be reasoned that when, on the other hand,
suit is brought to enforce an arbitrator's award, the union has in fact
submitted to the arbitration procedure and by disobeying the arbi-
trator's award is endangering the effectiveness of arbitration as a
peaceful means of settling disputes. l' Although there is some merit
to this distinction, it would appear that both in the case of no-strike
injunctions and the specific enforcement of back-to-work awards, the
court's power is being used to enjoin a work stoppage, 183 and that
consequently the same view should be taken toward both types of
relief.
The other alternatives which the courts have with respect to this
problem are identical to those discussed in the previous section.1'
These choices are to hold the decision in Sinclair applicable to federal
court orders enforcing back-to-work awards and either: (1) require
in addition that, as a matter of uniformity, the state courts refrain
from issuing such relief; or (2) sacrifice a degree of uniformity in an
attempt to accommodate Norris-LaGuardia and 301 by confining the
operation of the latter to federal courts and permitting state courts
to issue orders enforcing arbitrators' back-to-work awards as a matter
of federal law and under federally-prescribed standards. However,
the former alternatives should be considered only in the absence of
a reversal of Sinclair, which is, in the final analysis, the most effective
method of promoting the enforcement of labor agreements and
achieving the intent of Congress in enacting section 301.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Note has not made an exhaustive study of possible federal
system problems arising under section 301. It has attempted to
suggest the proper analytical format in which some of the more
important federal-state conflicts should be viewed, and to indicate
solutions to specific issues where appropriate. The embryonic state
of the federal "substantive" law in this area has enabled the courts to
decide cases without identifying the source of the law applied, and
thus to avoid difficult federal-state conflicts. It is suggested that
neither the fashioning of federal labor law nor the development of
182. See International Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Philadelphia Marine Ass'n, 389 U.S.
64 (1967) (Mr. Justice Douglas, dissenting).
183. See Marine Transport Lines v. Curran, 65 L.R.R.M. 2095 (D.C.N.Y. 1967),
and note 4 supra and accompanying text.
184. See notes 167-75 supra and accompanying text.
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standards to determine the role of state law is fostered in this manner.
Accordingly, a state court must examine each issue with which it is
confronted with reference to its effect upon the negotiation and
administration of collective bargaining agreements. If conflicting
results on the issue from jurisdiction to jurisdiction are likely to
have a disruptive effect upon these processes, then the state tribunal
is bound to apply federal law and identify its source as such. On the
other hand, if uniformity is not required, the state court may resort
to local rules. Even here, the discretion over local rules must be
exercised in such a fashion as not to unduly hinder the assertion of
federal rights.
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